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Abstract.  
I propose that Foucault‟s works, since he wrote Discipline and Punish, rely 
on an implicit meta-theory that is compatible with the fundamentals of 
Critical Realism. To this end I examine the status of truth, methodology and 
social ontology used by Foucault. If this thesis is correct, then a critical 
realist reading of Michel Foucault would avoid some of the pitfalls that have 
been attributed to his works - such as constructivism, determinism, 
localism, and reductionism. Moreover, this understanding of Foucault‟s 
works would also offer novel and challenging perspectives for researchers 
adopting a Foucauldian and/or critical realist study of organizations. 
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There appears to be much controversy in the field of organization studies 
over the works of Michel Foucault. On the one hand, authors as Burrell 
(1988), Jacques (1995), Knights (1990), Knights and Vurdubakis (in 
Jermier, Knights et al. 1994), Knights and Willmott (1989), Mc Kinlay and 
Taylor (1996), Townley (1994) have identified in Foucault‟s works 
promising perspectives for casting a fresh gaze on contemporary 
organizations. On the other, authors such as Ackroyd and Thompson 
(1999) , Findlay and Newton (1998), Reed (1998; 2000), Rowlinson and 
Carter (2002) issue alarming warnings and severely criticise such 
“Foucauldian” perspectives. For instance, Reed (2000) structured his 
critique of Foucauldian discourse analysis1 around 
„… five interrelated themes: constructivism, nominalism, determinism, 
localism, and reductionism. Each of these in [his] view, identifies major 
limitations and weaknesses of the Foucauldian approach to analysing 
organizational discourse.” (Reed 2000: 524, text modified). 
 
My thesis is however that Michel Foucault‟s works, since „The Discourse 
on Language‟ and Discipline and Punish, rely on a consistent social 
ontology to a large extent congruent with critical realism. The latter entails 
an ontological framework that was initially developed by Bhaskar (1975; 
1998) and that has flourished in various disciplines such as economics 
(Lawson 1997), sociology (Archer 1995), and Management studies: 
Ackroyd and Fleetwood (2000), Fleetwood (2005), Fleetwood and Ackroyd 
(2004), Sayer (2000).  
By showing that Foucault relies (albeit implicitly) on a critical realist social 
ontology, I attempt to show that even if criticisms such as those formulated 
by Reed (Cf supra) apply to many “Foucauldian” students of organizations 
they do not apply to the later works of Foucault. Moreover, I am not the 
                                            
1
 The expression “Foucauldian discourse analysts” refers not to Foucault but to 
writers claiming to be his followers. (Reed, personal communication) 
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only student of Foucault who advocates a realist reading of his works. 
Marsden, for instance, defended the possibility of a critical realist reading 
of Foucault that would be “…stimulated by several points of resemblance 
between Foucault and realism which suggest a prima facie case for their 
compatibility.‟ (Marsden 1999: pp. 181-2) 
My purpose is to move one step beyond the prima facie recognition of 
points of resemblance between Foucault and critical realism. Thus, I 
attempt to highlight firm points of anchorage between Foucault‟s later 
works and critical realist meta-theory - that is its ontology, epistemology 
and methodology. However, since Foucault‟s ontology is implicit, not 
explicit, my demonstration is necessarily based on a limited set of elements 
in his work that appear, nonetheless, to be central and recurrent in his later 
writings after the shift from archaeology to genealogy he initiated in his 
„Discourse on Language‟ (Foucault 1970). These later writings include 
notably „Discipline and Punish‟ (Foucault 1977), „The History of sexuality‟ 
(Foucault 1978), „The Subject and Power‟ (Foucault in Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982) as well as some interviews Foucault (1979), Foucault and 
Gordon (1980), Foucault and Rabinow (Foucault and Rabinow). They 
exclude, however, „The Order of Things‟ (Foucault 1971), „The 
Archaeology of Knowledge‟ (Foucault 1972), „The Birth of the Clinic‟ 
(Foucault 1973) and „Madness and Civilisation‟ (Foucault 1965). 
Furthermore, I aim to open a discussion, not to close it. Therefore I do not 
expect all my readers to agree with every claim I make but would be very 
content if this paper provides some material for further dialogue between 
post structuralist and critical realist researchers.  
 
1. What is specific about critical realist meta-theory? 
Preliminary to any further investigation of Foucault‟s work, I attempt to 
summarize the features that are necessary for any theory to be compatible 
with a critical realist meta-theory. If I am right, these features may be 
(reasonably well) expressed under the form of a number of points that fall 
into three larger categories: a) the status of truth and error, b) the social 
ontology and epistemology of social science and, finally, c) finally, the 
methodological principles for social scientific practice.  
Ismael Al-Amoudi 4 
 
a. The status of truth and error 
CR distinguishes between the „transitive‟ and the „intransitive‟ dimensions 
of knowledge. The transitive dimension refers to the field of references and 
comprises such objects as: Discourses, concepts, beliefs, impressions and 
so on. On the other hand, the intransitive dimension of knowledge refers to 
the world to which transitive objects refer. It comprises such objects as 
rocks, birds, people, social relations, beliefs, concepts and so on. Notably, 
the intransitive dimension includes the transitive dimension but is not 
limited to it. For instance, the word “rock” belongs to both transitive and 
intransitive dimensions whereas rocks themselves only belong to the 
intransitive dimension. CR suggests that the transitive dimension is socially 
constructed and therefore open to ambiguity and error. CR defends 
nonetheless a conception of truth as depending on the adequacy between 
the meaning of the reference formulated in the transitive dimension and the 
nature of its referent in the intransitive dimension. Thus, CR is realist 
concerning both transitive and intransitive dimensions, relativist concerning 
the transitive dimension alone, and (judgementally) rationalist2 concerning 
the relation between transitive and intransitive dimensions. 
 
b. The critical realist social ontology and epistemology 
According to CR authors, the fact that natural science necessitates 
experimentation suggests that the world is not only composed of events 
and experiences but that it is also composed of (metaphorically) deep 
mechanisms. It is not usually possible for a single theory to encompass all 
the mechanisms present in the world as it is composed of multiple strata 
                                            
2
 NB: CR authors traditionally use the term 'judgemental rationality' instead of 
'rationalism'. This is because the process of judging and choosing between various 
competing theories necessarily happens within a community and depends to some 
extent on its norms and practices. 
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not reducible to each other. Hence, critical realism defends an ontology of 
stratification and emergence (Cf figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1: The Stratification of Kinds of Being  
(Source: Collier 1994: 108) 
Rational
beings
Living beings
Material beings
 
 
Bhaskar presents the ontological differences between social strata and the 
more basic ones on which they are grounded by stating that: 
„1. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist 
independently of the activities they govern. 
2. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist 
independently of agents‟ conceptions of what they are doing in their 
activity. 
3. Social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relatively 
enduring (so that the tendencies they ground may not be universal 
in the sense of space-time invariant).‟3 (Bhaskar 1998: 38) 
In order to account for both individual freedom and social structure, 
Bhaskar claims that they constitute two distinct strata that are however 
inseparable since they reproduce and/or transform each other. Hence the 
                                            
3
 It should be noted that, as Lawson Lawson, T. (1997). Economics and reality. 
London ; New York, Routledge. rightly remarks, the invariability of natural 
mechanisms might well be incorrect. This does not refute however the fact that 
social mechanisms are time-space dependent. 
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need for a system of mediating concepts: positions and practices. It follows 
that society, which is constituted by the relation between individuals‟ or 
groups‟ relations must be understood as the relatively enduring (but 
continuously transforming) network of positions-practices. 
 
c. Methodological principles for a critical realist social 
science 
Since, for the critical realist, the social world is composed of intricately 
related mechanisms, it follows that social science must abandon the 
deductive method and cannot rely on experiments. Rather, it must explain 
events by retrodicting to known mechanisms and it must seek for (yet 
unknown) mechanisms by retroduction, not deduction or induction. In 
addition to this methodological imperative, Bhaskar makes two proposals 
to counter-balance the impossibility of constant conjunctions of events and, 
thereby, closed systems. First, situations of crisis or transition might be 
illuminating since there might be fewer mechanisms actualised than in 
normal situations. Second, the existent (proto)theories held by agents 
about the specificities of their social settings can provide the social scientist 
with a starting point. Although this has to be a rectifiable starting point 
since science can be counter phenomenal4. 
 
2. Reconstructing Foucault’s meta-theory 
 
I would like now to analyse the congruity of Foucault‟s works with the meta-
theory of critical realism. In a perfect world, I would have presented the 
section on Foucault‟s social ontology (that is, on his transformational model 
of social activity) prior to the methodological sections on his use of 
                                            
4
 Both compensator and analogue were subject to discussion amongst critical 
realist authors. See for example Collier Grey, C. (1994). "Career as a Project of the 
Self and Labour Process Discipline." Sociology 28(2): 479. and Lawson Lawson, T. 
(1997). Economics and reality. London ; New York, Routledge. 
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scientific knowledge and on the relevance of his field of investigation. I 
have chosen however to start with the two latter sections because they 
clarify two possible misunderstandings about Foucault. The first one is his 
so-called (judgemental) relativism, while the second is the range of his 
conclusions, which have arguably been misunderstood by many theorists.  
 
a. Revisiting the status of truth and error in Foucault’s 
works 
The question is the following: Is Foucault considering that truth is a mere 
social product, since he affirms that knowledge and power are intimately 
linked and that knowledge produces “ truths ” to which we submit? 
„We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not 
simply because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); 
that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations.... In short, it is not the 
activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of 
knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the 
process of struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that 
determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.‟ (Foucault 
1977: pp. 27-8) 
Does Foucault consider truth to be entirely a matter of convention, or 
agreement? Does he consider truth to be unconnected to the intransitive 
realm? In short, does he consider truth to be merely a social construct – 
where the term “merely” implies that there is no connection between a truth 
claim made within a community and some intransitive entity? After all he 
does suggest that knowledge and power are intimately linked and that 
knowledge produces regimes of truth.  If this means that science is 
unconnected with the intransitive realm; that any claim to truth is always-
already doomed by the impurity of a scientific activity which maintains 
secret and mysterious relations with power, then two disastrous 
consequences follow in the interpretation of Foucault. Firstly, his claim is 
that if the object of scientific inquiry can be reduced to (or explained away 
by) the social mechanisms which govern science, then Foucault very 
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clearly commits the “epistemic fallacy” and denies that the truth of scientific 
discourse is subordinated to the reality of its object of investigation. In this 
case, the attempt at grounding Foucault in a critical realist framework 
should stop here and my argument is flawed. Secondly, by assuming this 
position, Foucault would undermine his own theses as he would be 
committing a performative contradiction (Habermas) - that is a 
contradiction held not between two contradictory explicit statements but 
between one explicit statement and an implicit, albeit necessary, statement 
implied by the very performance of the speech act (e.g. “I did not write 
these lines”). In effect, if knowledge is only determined by social 
constraints, then Foucault‟s own opus is necessarily a mere social product. 
In this case, his arguments would not have more value than any other 
contradictory arguments. At best, his work would present an interest as 
(poor) poesy. If it is the case that Foucault maintains that truth is only 
socially determined, then he must admit in turn that his own work entirely 
constructs the reality to which it pretends to refer. 
It is crucial, therefore, to show how Foucault can affirm at the same time 
that power and knowledge are socially and historically inseparable5 and 
that science can lead to true knowledge that depends on its object of 
investigation. The answer, I think, lies in the subordination of archaeology 
to genealogy. In Foucault‟s later works (Discipline and Punish, The History 
of Sexuality), the point of analysing discourse is no longer to retrace the 
sovereign unity of thought that can be found at a given period. Rather, 
Foucault is interested in science because it is a social practice. To what 
                                            
5
 Contrary to a criticism formulated in Archer, M. S. (1988). Culture and agency: 
The place of culture in social theory. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York, 
Cambridge University Press. and reiterated mot pour mot in Archer, M. S. (1995). 
Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press., it may be worth stressing that historical inseparability does not 
imply necessarily ontological or analytical inseparability. Thus, Foucault‟s „power-
knowledge‟ is understood here more as a „specific form of amalgamation‟ than as 
an amalgam enjoying a form of ontological unity.  
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extent can the consideration of science as a social practice avoid the two 
pitfalls mentioned above?  
First, let us note that Bhaskar readily admits that knowledge is not only 
determined by its intransitive objects but also by social mechanisms. 
Knowledge, then, is a social phenomenon and Bhaskar‟s point is that it is 
erroneous to conclude from the very social nature of knowledge that it 
constructs alone the object to which it actually refers (Bhaskar 1975: p. 
195). I would like to illustrate a similar point about Foucault by analysing 
his study of scientific activity. When he studies the process of (let us say 
for clarity) medicine, the nature of the objects of enquiry are quite different: 
The medical scientist studies the body as the locus of disease whereas 
Foucault studies the activities of the medical scientist and is therefore 
interested in the body as an object for scientific investigation. If we 
keep to the distinction between transitive and intransitive dimensions, we 
could say that the intransitive objects of the medical scientist comprise 
such things as bodies and the natural mechanisms that help explain their 
(dys)functioning. However, the intransitive objects of Foucault would 
comprise such things as the activities of the medical scientist, the 
discourses she re/produces, the network of relations in which she acts 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 6). Moreover, the transitive dimension of the 
medical scientist comprises the medical discourse on biological 
mechanisms, health, illness and so on. It is different from Foucault‟s 
transitive dimension that comprises his own theories about medical 
scientist activities but not those of the medical scientist he studies. (Cf 
figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: Foucault’s intransitive dimension
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Foucault‟s object of investigation is two-fold. First, he studies the relation of 
the scientific practice to its object: how is the (intransitive) object 
investigated as a scientific (transitive) one? What means does the scientist 
use for her enquiry? What are the main issues facing her or, in other 
words, what are the “problématiques” with which she is confronted? It 
appears that the relation of scientific practice to its object is not only 
determined by the nature of the investigated object or by the scientific 
progress made. For example the absence of dissections in Europe until the 
16th century cannot be explained in terms of the state of scientific 
knowledge, but rather in terms of social constraints (law, religion, beliefs, 
morality, etc.) Hence, the second question Foucault poses is then: what 
social mechanisms enabled (and encouraged) the study of this aspect of 
reality rather than that other one? And what were in turn the social 
consequences? For example, what new social mechanisms made 
“possible and necessary the appearance of houses of confinement”? What, 
in turn, were the repercussions of these houses of confinement on society? 
It follows from the intransitive dimension Foucault studies that the very 
validity of the sciences under scrutiny is voluntarily left unquestioned. 
Whether the practice of a particular science is epistemically grounded and 
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whether the knowledge it generates is adequate are not relevant since 
both false and true beliefs have social consequences and are socially 
enabled. Therefore, the existence of an intransitive dimension for science 
is maintained though not studied and Foucault‟s study of science is not 
doomed to relativism.  
Moreover, the very knowledge generated by Foucault has itself a well-
defined intransitive dimension: that of the relationship between power 
relations and scientific practice. Since “dubious” science can have as much 
social consequence as legitimate science, and since the social 
consequences are not necessarily good or liberating ones6, it follows that, 
though not a relativist (about the intransitive dimension), Foucault is also 
not “scientistic” in the sense of having an unquestioned optimism about 
science: 
„There is nothing “scientistic” in this (that is, a dogmatic belief in the 
value of scientific knowledge), but neither is it a sceptical or relativistic 
refusal of all verified truth. What is questioned is the way in which 
knowledge circulates and functions, its relations to power. In short the 
régime du savoir.‟ (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 212) 
Finally, although Foucault cites many legitimate sciences, he nonetheless 
focuses his attention on the most “dubious ones”: e.g. clinical medicine, 
psychiatry and criminology (Foucault and Rabinow 1986). I believe there is 
a reason for this. Since Foucault is interested in the social aspect of 
science it can be envisaged that this social aspect will appear with more 
clarity for “dubious” sciences.  
 
                                            
6
 Is it necessary to remind that Auschwitz, as a machine for extermination, for 
purification and for the constitution of knowledge would have never been possible 
without numerous "perfectly legitimate" sciences? Needless to say, science alone 
does not explain how Auschwitz came to happen. 
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b. Foucault’s methodology: studying an open social 
world 
In this section, I contend that the methodology of Foucault‟s project is 
highly consistent with the critical realist methodological premises for the 
study of society as an open system without possible closure. Accordingly I 
will tackle the issues of Foucault‟s fields of investigation, as well as the way 
he uses history. 
One of the things Foucault is often reproached for is that, by studying 
prisons and asylums, he blinded himself to many other forms of power 
relations and, hence, incorrectly deduced a carceral vision of society. 
Anthony Giddens appears to have reproached Foucault on similar grounds 
since as one author critically puts it: 
„[Giddens] approval of Foucault‟s work is conditional. It is not taken as a 
contribution to the project of a general social theory, but to a subclass 
of social theory - the theory of administrative power. It is taken, then, to 
be a theory of the third rank, operating not at the primary level of 
foundational clarification of a philosophical kind, nor at the secondary 
level of a general social theory, but below and subordinate to both of 
these superior levels.‟ (Boyne 1990: 59, text modified) 
 
Giddens‟ comments (and any others similar to his) imply that a mechanism 
isolated in a certain field would not exist outside of it or, in other words, that 
society is a juxtaposition of isolated systems. In my view, this entails a 
serious misunderstanding of the motives of Foucault‟s study of asylums 
and prisons. Needless to say, Michel Foucault is not Jean Genet and 
contrary to the French poet and novelist he does not love prison for its own 
sake. If we look at the reasons why Foucault has been interested in 
carceral power it appears that his objective is to obtain knowledge about 
society, not about the prison or the asylum. Thus Foucault makes it clear 
that he studies prisons “ as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power 
relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the 
methods used ” (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 211). Therefore if 
Foucault focuses on prisons it is precisely because he wanted to isolate a 
transphenomenal mechanism (that is, disciplinary power) that is actualised 
but less visible in other organizational settings such as factories and court-
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houses. In short, by focusing on prisons, Foucault not only admits the 
openness of the social world, but he also presupposes it and adapts his 
methods of investigation to it. 
It can also be asked why Foucault bothered himself with the burden of 
historical accounts, sometimes over periods going back to the middle ages 
while he was concerned with present social mechanisms. The answer is, I 
think, to be found in Foucault‟s genealogical use of history. It is important 
to distinguish what Foucault means by “genealogy”, since the word can be 
doubly misleading. Let us first note that Foucault‟s use of genealogy avoids 
the so-called “genealogical fallacy” which consists in reducing (explaining 
away) a current state by referring to a former one. This way of proceeding 
is incompatible with both critical realism (since it denies the possibility of 
stratification and emergence) and with Foucault (since it would assume a 
continuous and homogeneous development of history). The second 
misinterpretation would be to identify Foucault‟s “genealogy” with 
Nietzsche‟s “genealogy”. However, I understand Foucault‟s denomination 
of his historical practice as homage: Foucault has borrowed the word from 
Nietzsche but has not, however, borrowed its exact content. 
„Whereas Nietzsche often seems to ground morality and social 
institutions in the tactics of individual actors, Foucault totally 
depsychologises this approach and sees all psychological motivation 
not as the source but as the result of strategies without strategists.‟ 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 109)
7
 
Thus, Foucault‟s use of history can be better understood by referring to his 
statement that 
                                            
7
 Dreyfus and Rabinow's claim about all psychological motivations may be slightly 
excessive. Foucault's point is rather that: 'the logic is perfectly clear, the aims 
decipherable, yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them' 
Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York, Pantheon. Compare with 
Bhaskar's statement that: 'purposefulness, intentionality and sometimes self-
consciousness characterize human actions but not transformations in the social 
structure' Bhaskar, R. (1998). The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique 
of the contemporary human sciences. London ; New York, Routledge. 
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„[he] would like to write the history of the prison, with all the political 
investment on the body it gathers together in its closed architecture. 
Why? Simply because [he is] interested in the past? No, if one means 
by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one 
means writing the history of the present.‟ (Foucault 1977: 31, text 
modified) 
By affirming that he tries to write a history of the present Foucault detaches 
himself from two ways of writing history. He aims neither to give a 
“totalising” picture of the past, nor does he try to write a history of the past 
by referring to present meanings (and thus ignoring the shifting nature of 
social mechanisms). Instead, what Foucault aims at doing is to begin with 
a (rough) diagnosis of the current situation. In the The History of Sexuality 
vol.1, for example, he diagnoses the importance of the mechanism of 
confession. He then isolates the particular components of this relation of 
power8. These components form an apparatus, a “grid of intelligibility” or 
system of relations that can be established between (ontologically 
heterogeneous) elements such as  
„Discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral 
and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the 
unsaid.‟ (Foucault and Gordon 1980: 194) 
However, whereas archaeology is preoccupied with the reconstitution of 
the apparatus, genealogy is interested in taking each of its components 
literally, and following the web of social relations which supports them (and 
which they support and modify). Hence the objective of Foucault‟s 
genealogy is to study the effects of the elements of the apparatus and not 
their meaning. Finally, Foucault follows through history initially isolated 
components of the apparatus and then studies their current convergence. 
In this light, it might be easier to understand why Foucault‟s analyses were 
deemed to lack (traditional chronological) narrative (Rowlinson and Carter 
2002: 532). What should, in fact, be noted about Foucault‟s discourse is 
                                            
8
 A critical realist could argue that relations of power are social mechanisms to the 
extent that they make a difference to the field of possible actions between two 
persons. 
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less the absence of a narrative than the presence of a diachronic form of 
narration that follows the chronology not of a group or a society as a whole, 
but rather of a particular mechanism or a particular aspect of society. For 
example, when Foucault studies the mechanism of confession as an 
important ritual of power in which a specific technology of the body was 
forged through an imperative of verbalising one‟s sex life, 
„[he] is not giving us a history of the seventeenth century. He is not 
claiming even that this imperative was of the greatest import then. 
Instead he is isolating the central components of political technology 
today and tracing them back in time. Foucault writes the history of the 
confession in the seventeenth century for the purposes of writing “a 
history of the present”.‟ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 119) 
It could be argued that Foucault‟s avoidance of both presentism and 
classic “ totalising history” is adapted to the fact that society is an open 
system and that it is composed of relatively enduring social structures. 
Foucault‟s histories of the present seek the multiple mechanisms that 
converged at a particular time to form a complex and (at first sight) obscure 
mechanism. Let us retrace the main steps of his approach. First, he often 
starts from a commonly held view (e.g. that prisons appeared because of 
the need of the Bourgeoisie for a cheap workforce) and seeks to move 
beyond them. In doing this, his approach is close to the “analogue” 
defended by Bhaskar. The aim of his study, however, is precisely to go 
beyond common views. He shows, for example, in Discipline and Punish 
that the commonly held view is wrong, since prisoners always performed 
useless tasks and suggests (Foucault and Gordon 1980: 40) that prisons 
were maintained because they were useful for policy makers in ways that 
long escaped the analyses of observers from the academic world: prisons 
create delinquents who help the police in its activity of surveillance and 
they drive the attention away from the “illegalities” committed by members 
of the higher strata of society. Hence he considers that social mechanisms 
can be counter-phenomenal. But then, how does Foucault explain the 
existence, perpetuation and transformation of social mechanisms without 
recurring to functionalist accounts that would explain them wholly in terms 
of their social functions? To these issues we now turn. 
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c. Foucault’s social ontology: a stratified and 
transformational conception of social reality 
The detractors of Foucauldian analysis often accuse it of being incapable 
of distinguishing ontologically and analytically between human agency and 
social constraint. As Reed puts it 
„By denying any ontological and/or analytical differentiation between 
creative agency and structural constraint, Foucauldian discourse 
analysis ends up with an explanatory logic which is unable to 
distinguish between „open doors‟ and „brick walls‟ (Reed 1998: 209) 
 
Arguably, distinguishing between freedom and constraint should not mean 
that, on the one hand, it is possible to find actions which are purely free, 
liberated from any form of constraint, while, on the other there can exist 
purely structural constraints in which human freedom is deleted. Even 
recognising that most actions present the characteristics of both is not 
enough to make the argument credible. Structural constraint is necessarily 
enabled by agents‟ actions. Conversely, these actions, if they are to have 
any shape or any meaning, must be limited by a form of constraint. Neither 
the dead body nor the mad man dancing are examples of structural 
constraint or of human agency. Moreover, if structure is characterised by 
constraint, and agency by freedom, then we assume a model of Social 
Reality presenting the same inconsistencies as the one developed by 
Berger and Luckmann9 (1967). On the contrary, the critical realist social 
ontology assumes that: action presupposes both structure and agency; 
structure enables and constrains; and action reproduces and transforms 
structure.  
I would now like to show that Foucault works with an (implicit) ontology that 
shares the crucial characteristics of the critical realist ontology as it 
assumes a relational conception of society and considers structures as 
                                            
9
 For a critique of the Berger & Luckmann model, see Bhaskar Bhaskar, R. (1998). 
The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human 
sciences. London ; New York, Routledge. 
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both enabling and constraining for agency. Moreover, I argue that 
Foucault‟s ontology is stratified as it differentiates between biological, 
individual and social realms. There is, however, a difficulty concerning the 
fact that Foucault uses a vocabulary that is different from critical realist 
vocabulary. Thus, our excavation of the ontological presuppositions of 
Foucault must be augmented by a work of translation of the elements that 
may be interpreted as sharing identical referents but different references in 
each framework. For instance Foucault does not use the words structure 
and agency but refers to “the political” or “strategies” (processes located at 
the level of social relations that may not be attributed to any specific 
people) and to “tactics” (processes consciously initiated by people). He 
does not consider power as a (rare) substance to be seized but rather as a 
relation between people in which one person‟s actions modifies the range 
of actions of another person. Hence, any social relation between persons 
entails power relations and any power relation supposes a social relation. 
„What therefore would be proper to a relationship of power is that it be a 
mode of action upon actions. That is to say, power relations are rooted 
deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted “above” society as a 
supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps 
dream of. In any case, to live in society is to live in such a way that 
action upon other actions is possible - and in fact ongoing. A society 
without power relations can only be an abstraction.‟ (Foucault in 
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: pp. 222-3) 
By studying society through power, Foucault is therefore adopting a 
relational conception of society. Moreover, he does not consider power as 
mere restriction as do the authors who write about structural constraint 
without mentioning as a corollary that it enables action. Rather his point is 
that power has both a negative and a positive role, that it constrains as well 
as it enables. Hence, power relations not only prohibit actions or limit the 
field of possible actions, they also enable fields of action and permit the 
constitution of knowledge. However taking as a given that power is at the 
same time restrictive (negative) and enabling (positive), to what extent do 
power relations sustain/rely on social reality? Foucault‟s point about this is 
that: “people know what they do, they sometime know why they do it, but 
what they don‟t know is what they do does.” (Foucault, personal 
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communication with Dreyfus and Rabinow, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1982: 187). This amounts to saying that the use of power leads to 
deliberate tactics (of which the person may or may not be aware), but at 
the same time it leads also to unintended strategies of power. Hence, 
„The rationality of power is characterised by tactics which are often 
quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed (the local 
cynicism of power), tactics which, becoming connected to one another, 
attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of 
support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive 
systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is 
often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who 
can be said to have formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the 
great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which coordinate the 
loquacious tactics whose “inventors” or decision makers are often 
without hypocrisy‟ (Foucault 1978: 95) 
Two conclusions can be drawn from Foucault‟s conception of power. 
Firstly, by distinguishing between strategies and tactics, Foucault is clearly 
working with a stratified and differentiated social reality in which the 
mechanisms governing strategies (relative to social relations) are not the 
same as those governing tactics (relative to people). Secondly, we can 
recognise here crucial elements of Bhaskar‟s ontology: Thus, not only does 
Foucault have a relational conception of society but also he recognises 
that people‟s actions and social relations exist in virtue of two groups of 
mechanisms that are ontologically distinct.  
In addition to the strata of tactics/individuals and strategies/society, 
Foucault also takes account of the more basic stratum of biology. This is 
particularly noticeable in his use of “biopower” as an instance of power 
preoccupied with the government as humans to the extent that they 
constitute a biological specie. Hence, according to him, one cannot 
understand modern society without studying the web of power-knowledge 
relations that traverses it from the strata of strategies to the very biological 
strata of human beings as a population (Foucault 1978: 143). Furthermore, 
strategies and tactics (Foucault‟s designation) have the same influences 
on people‟s practice as the strata of individuals and society (Bhaskar‟s 
designation): strategies both limit and enable tactics, while tactics both 
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reproduce (sustain) and produce (modify) existing strategies. Foucault 
refers to the influence of strategies over tactics as “technologies of power”, 
while he refers to the influence of tactics on strategies as “tactics of power” 
(Cf figure 2.3) 
 
Figure 2.3: Foucault’s model of stratification of social reality
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If my reading of Foucault is accepted, then it should undermine one of the 
major criticisms formulated by Archer against Foucault, i.e. that “the later 
work [of Foucault] endorses the arbitrariness of socio-cultural interaction 
because no account is given of why, when or how people do struggle.” 
(Archer 1988: xviii). I agree with Archer that Foucault does not dedicate as 
much space to examining processes of struggle as he dedicates to 
processes of domination. However in Foucault‟s study, struggle is neither 
unthinkable nor completely omitted. For instance, the chapter “Illegalities 
and delinquency” in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977: 257-92) is full of 
examples of such struggles occurring in the 19th Century. These include: A 
young delinquent replying to the judge by formulating the illegalities he had 
accomplished as freedom rather than as offence; workers‟ newspapers 
writing “counter fait-divers” to oppose the vision of delinquents mediated by 
bourgeois “fait divers”; judges and lawyers attempting (unsuccessfully) to 
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break the “police-prison-delinquency” structure; the chained prisoners 
resorting to songs to praise their own crimes; and so on. The crucial point 
to be grasped however is that, in a given field, tactics of resistance and 
tactics of domination need to resort to various technologies of power that 
are defined by a common strategy. 
I hope that my interpretation of Foucault‟s stratification of reality is now 
clearer and the different strata of his ontology have been identified. The 
question, however, of how Foucault manages to link structure and agency 
is not yet evident. My point is that, although Foucault did not pose the 
problem of the links between strata in the same terms as Bhaskar, it is 
nonetheless possible to locate in his work similar concepts that constitute a 
point of contact between human agency and social structures. I will argue 
that these concepts both endure and are immediately occupied by 
individuals. However, the fact that they are immediately occupied by the 
individual does not mean that they appear immediately in sovereign clarity 
in front of the analyst. Rather, as they have to be individuated relationally, 
a great deal of work must be undertaken to disentangle the networks they 
constitute. For Foucault, institutions; apparatuses and, finally, subjects are 
examples of such mediating concepts. (Cf figure 2.4) 
 
Figure 2.4: Foucault’s transformational model of social activity
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Foucault affirms that it is perfectly legitimate to study power through 
“carefully defined” institutions, but that this is not sufficient to grasp all the 
range of relevant power relations. Nonetheless, institutions provide the 
analyst with a useful (though approximate) range of „slots‟ occupied by the 
individual in the more general structure of power. In institutions, the 
positions (places, rules, functions, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) and practices 
that individuals occupy appear easily. However institutions alone might 
mislead the observer since she runs the risk of interpreting all the relations 
of power by referring exclusively to the particularity of the institution. 
Hence, in order to study institutions, Foucault uses another, deeper, 
mediating concept, that of apparatuses. The apparatus has a double role 
for Foucault. First, it is a “grid of analysis” for his historical investigation and 
second, it refers to a range of heterogeneous elements at play (CF supra). 
These elements have two particularities. The first one is that they act 
directly on the individual‟s actions (and sometimes on her body), the 
second one is that they are invested by the “deep” mechanism of power 
Foucault the genealogist is seeking to excavate. Hence, they constitute 
privileged links between the biological, the tactical and the strategic strata. 
Finally I would put among Foucault‟s mediating concepts the very mode of 
subjectification of the individual. For Foucault, the word subject has 
clearly two complementary meanings: 
„Subject to someone else by control and dependence and tied to his 
own identity by a conscience or self knowledge. Both meanings 
suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.‟ 
(Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 212) 
 
Unfortunately, I do not have enough space to define with precision the 
status of the subject in Foucault‟s work and to show to what extent „in his 
later work […] he began to reinstate a more robust self concept, one strong 
enough to restore the “problem of structure and agency” which the notion 
of resistance ineluctably implies.‟ (Archer 2000: 19-20). I would like, 
however, to highlight an interesting difference between Foucault and 
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Bhaskar. Although both authors share a common ontology and respect 
similar epistemological principles, they do not direct social investigation in 
exactly the same way. For Bhaskar, it seems that the system of mediating 
concepts is considered as a tool for further investigation of the social 
strata. For Foucault, although the investigation of social strata begins with 
the mediating concepts of institutions and is pursued with that of 
apparatuses, the aim of his studies is oriented in direction of a third type of 
mediating concept, that of the individual as subject. However, if both 
frameworks share the same ontology and epistemology it is arguable that, 
not only are both types of investigation compatible, but that they may also 
support each other. In this case, Foucauldians would use social 
mechanisms to investigate mediating concepts, while Bhaskarians would 
investigate social mechanisms with mediating concepts refined by 
Foucauldians. 
 
3. Consequences for critical realist critiques of Foucault 
Even if the interpretation of Foucault I propose is accepted, the 
consequence cannot be that critical realists should accept every 
substantial claim made by Foucault. For instance, CR authors need not 
share Foucault‟s views on the development of disciplinary power in modern 
times or on the problematization of sexuality as a central object of 
knowledge. Thus, authors disagreeing with Foucault could attempt to show 
either that Foucault‟s historical accounts of the genealogy of disciplinary 
power are inaccurate, that he did not bother to recast disciplinary power in 
perspective and omitted important non-disciplinary species of 
contemporary power, that he failed to distinguish between legitimate and 
non-legitimate power (or, better, to characterise precisely the legitimacy of 
the powers he analysed) and so on. The point is however that if they are to 
disagree with Foucault, their disagreement ought to be located at the level 
of his theories, not his meta-theory. This leads us to refute the criticisms 
formulated by Reed (2000) insofar as Foucault is concerned (but not 
necessarily some his followers). Is Foucault a constructivist in the sense 
that „there is nothing outside discourse but more discourse‟ (Reed 2000: 
525) or is he determinist to the extent that „the functioning of discourse is 
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treated as largely autonomous and independent of human agency‟? (Ibid) 
As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) convincingly argue, this may well have 
been the case at the time of writing the „Order of Things‟ and the 
„Archaeology of Knowledge‟ but not after Foucault‟s genealogical turn and 
his study of apparatus (CF supra). Similarly I hope that by clarifying how 
tactics of power are constrained and enabled by overall strategies of power 
I have provided some ground to refute charges of localism (incapacity to 
deal with institutionalised stabilities and continuities in power relations) and 
reductionism (blindness to the wider socio-political context). We are still 
left, however, with the question of whether Foucault is prone to 
nominalism, understood as: „any form of interpretation or explanation is 
necessarily relative to and constrained by the discursive framework and 
context in which it originates and becomes reproduced as knowledge' 
(Reed 2000) Arguably Foucault is a nominalist in this sense of the term. It 
could perhaps be argued, however, that critical realism can be congruent 
with nominalism defined in these terms, especially if one wants to avoid the 
ontic fallacy (Bhaskar 1975) consisting in ignoring the social processes 
through which knowledge is constituted. Thus, Foucault may not escape 
the charge of nominalism but he may escape the problems commonly 
associated with it! 
 
4. Consequences for further Foucauldian study: an 
illustration 
I would now like to provide a brief illustration of the contribution that a 
critical realist reading of Foucault could make to Foucauldian students of 
organization. To this end, I consider the Foucauldian study conducted by 
Grey (1994). Grey‟s study is exemplary in both senses of the term. On the 
one hand it is insightful and rigorously conducted, on the other it is widely 
cited and is illustrative of the way Foucauldians have treated such themes 
as power and identity. Grey‟s argument is that „career‟ constitutes a crucial 
“project of the self” for most professionals working in large chartered 
accountancy firms. He also goes further and shows that it  
“transforms the nature and meaning of [significant] exercises of 
disciplinary power… For, again and again, the techniques of 
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disciplinary power become construed as benevolent aids to career 
development.” (Grey 1994: 494, text modified) 
A critical realist reading of Foucault does not necessarily contradict the 
substance of the theses defended in Grey‟s paper. However, it could help 
theorise more precisely the causal relation between career as a project of 
the self and the emergence of a form of power regarded as “benevolent” by 
social participants. Indeed, Grey throws some light on the issues of what 
career is and how it is effective in sustaining this form of “benevolent” 
power. However, a critical realist would object that Grey‟s analysis draws a 
“flat” picture of the apparatus of “benevolent power” and does not locate its 
various processes at different levels of ontological depth. In the following 
paragraphs, I rely on my past experience as a professional in order to 
explore how a (metaphorically) “deeper” picture could be drawn. The 
purpose of this exercise is less to make a substantial contribution to the 
field of critical accounting than to illustrate how a critical realist reading of 
Foucault allows us to understand more fully the relation of causality 
between career and “benevolent” power. Moreover, the kind of knowledge 
it generates (retroductively) is necessarily open to contestation and 
refutation. Nonetheless, I hope that such an alternative understanding may 
be useful for understanding organizational forms and for transforming 
them. Thus, I also attempt to indicate (very roughly) how the strategy of 
power at play presents points of weakness at various levels and indicate 
possible tactics available to agents wishing to struggle against it. 
If we enquire through retroduction into the social mechanisms that make 
possible career as a locus for benevolent power we may come out with a 
list of more or less stratified structural causes such as:  
(i) the fact that (more often than not) auditors get accustomed to 
mystified forms of power relations in various settings of their 
previous curriculum: middle class families, university and 
experiences in graduate programmes. These forms of power 
relations are mystified as commands and are principally 
expressed under the form of demand and advice. Arguably, 
young people from lower-class families who start work 
immediately after school may not have had the opportunity to 
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learn much how to interpret the „soft‟ signs used by management 
to give commands. This mystified form of power relations is itself 
possible because of  
(ii) a myth of reciprocity and equality that is fostered in these 
same social settings and that leads in turn to accountants turning 
a blind eye on those aspects of discipline that reveal their very 
subordination as employees. Signs of reluctance as well as overt 
criticism of the asymmetry of power relations are avoided and 
have the double effect of making individual interlocutors very 
uncomfortable and of impeding the usual functioning of this 
strategy of power. This myth of equality is itself possible because  
(iii) In these settings (middle class family, university, accountancy) 
the subordinates are in a social trajectory offering them a fair 
chance of attaining in the future a social and economic status 
comparable to that of their current superordinates. Perhaps, if 
the professional prospects for (ex) auditors where duller, then 
much of the appraisal system would seem less benign and the 
notion of „career counselling‟ would make less sense. Moreover, 
if the prospects of salary increase were not bright then trainees 
would not be able to produce enthusiasm spontaneously despite 
the repetitive aspect of most tasks they perform. This social 
trajectory is itself made possible because of two sets of 
mechanisms 
(iva) There is an asymmetry of power between job hunters that 
favours those who worked previously in a well-established 
accountancy firm. Accountants working in large chartered 
accountancy firm either get promoted or leave the firm to find 
socially and economically appealing jobs in the industry. This 
asymmetry is all the more effective for the notion of „career‟ that 
it spreads across a wide range of institutions and countries. For 
example, an auditor leaving an accountancy firm in Paris could 
expect to find relatively easily a valued job in a pharmaceutical 
firm in Boston. However, the existence of the possibility of such 
trajectory is not enough to explain why professionals chose to 
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dedicate their efforts to pursuing it. Thus one also needs to 
understand how it necessitates 
(ivb) The obligation felt by professionals to maintain their status 
vis-à-vis themselves and their community (friends, spouses, 
families, colleagues, etc.) This obligation has both economic and 
ethical grounds. It is economic since by abandoning their current 
(advantageous) social status, professionals would exclude 
themselves from many costly social activities within their 
community. It is also ethical to the extent that professionals and 
their communities view career as an individual responsibility and 
a sign of flourishment. Thus, failure to develop a „successful‟ 
career is viewed as a direct sign of failure to having 
„successfully‟ lived one‟s life. To this extent, career can be 
viewed as a project of the self. 
Moreover, it could be possible to elaborate a genealogical account of this 
stratified strategy of benign and counselling power by retracing 
diachronically the historical emergence of the various mechanisms that 
contribute to its reproduction. Finally, it is worth noting that agents may use 
the elements thus mapped for their own local struggles. For instance, 
agents wishing to transform the current mystification of power relations 
could both act by promoting management programmes that insist on the 
constraining aspects of power and by using the help of ex-employees 
having experimented the “dark side” of these relations of power, for 
example at the moment of their breaking down. Moreover, the crucial 
influence of universities on desire for career may indicate that these can 
usefully be invested either by agents wishing to reinforce this desire 
(typically, accountancy firms dedicate much time and money for this 
purpose) or by agents wishing to counter it (for instance, critical OB 
supervisors). Also, actions against “benevolent” forms of power could also 
attempt to undermine the belief that people having undertaken such 
careers are not necessarily better job candidates than people having 
worked in the accountancy departments of other kinds of firms. For 
instance, tactical struggle could perhaps be conducted by putting forward 
failure stories of ex-accountants who switched to industry and were not 
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quite prepared for the requirements of their new post. Possible vectors for 
such actions could be associations of HR managers, professional 
newspapers or magazines and again, management schools. Finally, these 
“benevolent” forms of power could also suffer from attacks aimed at the 
relatively widespread belief that professional career reflects intrinsic 
personal qualities. For example, such a struggle could take the reverse 
form of the recurring theme of „hidden talents‟ that is so often used by large 
firms for the recruitment of careerist people. Perhaps a persuasive attack 
could present these talents not as „hidden‟ but as „wasted‟ because of the 
excessive demands of such firms on their employees. 
  
Summary and conclusion 
This paper has argued that a Critical Realist interpretation of Foucault is 
possible. By focusing on the distinction between tactics and strategies in 
Foucault‟s work, I have argued that it presents a stratified conception of 
social reality similar to Bhaskar‟s. I have also argued that Foucault, like 
Bhaskar, uses a system of mediating concepts linking structure and 
agency. However, Foucault does not take these concepts for granted and 
refines them along with his analysis. It has also been argued that Foucault 
developed an original approach to sociology by undertaking the task of a 
“history of the present”. This approach takes into consideration the time-
space shifts occurring in social structures and permits a counter-
phenomenal account of social reality. I argued that Foucault‟s most famous 
insight (that knowledge and power are interdependent and can be studied 
at once) entails neither a performative contradiction nor a recourse to the 
“epistemic fallacy”. By distinguishing between Foucault‟s transitive and 
intransitive objects, I have argued that Foucault‟s relativism is an epistemic 
relativism about the transitive dimension but that it does not imply an 
ontological relativism about the intransitive dimension. Moreover, I have 
outlined some consequences for researchers in the field of organization 
studies. Foucault‟s works are definitely not out of reach of critical realist 
authors‟ critical appreciations. However in order to discharge their full 
explanatory power the latter must be levelled at Foucault‟s theories rather 
than at his meta-theory. Similarly, I attempted to illustrate on an exemplary 
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piece of Foucauldian research (Grey 1994) what could be gained by 
adopting a critical realist reading of Foucault: Namely, the possibility of 
elaborating explanations that take into account the ontological stratification 
of social reality and of identifying strategic loci for social transformation. 
 
Note 
* I would like to thank Steve Fleetwood, Hugh Willmott and three 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. Ben Hardy has also helped me greatly by proof-reading the 
manuscript. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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